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Public Health Emergencies: a new peacekeeping mission?  
Insights from 810,/¶VUROHLQthe Liberia Ebola outbreak 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The meeting of the UN Security Council on 18 September 2014 represented a major 
turning-point in the international response to the Ebola outbreak then underway in 
West Africa. However, in the light of widespread criticisms over the tardiness of the 
international response, there is a case to be made that the UN, and particularly the 
Security Council, failed to make best use of a potential resource it already had on the 
ground in Liberia: UNMIL, the United Nations Mission in Liberia. This article 
examines the question of whether UNMIL could have done more to contribute to the 
emergency response and attempts to draw some lessons from this experience for 
potential peacekeeper involvement in future public health emergencies. We find that 
UNMIL could have done more than it did within the terms of its mandate, although 
even if it had chosen to do so it may well have been hampered by a number of factors 
including its own capacities, the views of Troop Contributing Countries, and the 
approach taken by the Liberian government.  We suggest this case can inform broader 
discussions over the provision of medical and other forms of humanitarian assistance 
by peacekeeping missions including those around the danger of politicizing 
humanitarian aid and peacekeepers doing more harm than good. Finally, we raise a 
concern that a UHOLDQFH RQ SHDFHNHHSHUV WR GHOLYHU KHDOWK VHUYLFHV GXULQJ µQRUPDO¶
times could foster a dangerous culture of dependency, hampering emergency 
responses if the need arises. 
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Introduction 
 
On 23 March 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported on its Disease 
Outbreak News website that the Guinean government had informed it of a virulent 
form of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) affecting the South-Eastern region of the country, 
with a case fatality rate of 59% (29 deaths out of 49 cases).1 The same day, Médecins 
sans Frontières released a statement reporting that it had launched an emergency 
response in collaboration with the Guinean Ministry of Health.2 Seven days later, on 
30 March, the Liberian Ministry of Health reported its first two confirmed cases of 
EVD to WHO, followed by Sierra Leone in late May. From that point on, there were 
near daily reports of new EVD cases in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In early 
August, the spread of the disease into Nigeria, and the repatriation of two infected 
health workers to the United States, provided the catalyst for the Director-General of 
the WHO to convene an Emergency Committee under the International Health 
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Regulations and formally declare the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC).3   
Although assistance to the region gradually began to increase following the 
declaration of a PHEIC, the meeting of the UN Security Council on 18 September 
represented a major turning-point in the international response. At that meeting, the 
6HFXULW\&RXQFLOSDVVHG5HVROXWLRQGHWHUPLQLQJWKDWWKHµXQSUHFHGHQWHG
extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and 
VHFXULW\¶4 The operative clauses of that Resolution called on a range of actors to do 
more, including the governments of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea; the African 
Union; ECOWAS; the EU; WHO; UNHAS (the United Nations Humanitarian Air 
Service); and other UN Member States. It also called on governments in the region to 
lift border restrictions that had been imposed as a result of the outbreak. At the same 
WLPH WKH &RXQFLO ZHOFRPHG ³WKH LQWHQWLRQ RI WKH 6HFUHWDU\-General to convene a 
high-level meeting on the margins of the sixty-ninth United Nations General 
Assembly to urge DQ H[FHSWLRQDO DQG YLJRURXV UHVSRQVH WR WKH (EROD RXWEUHDN´,5 
signalling its approval of the creation of UNMEER, the United Nations Mission for 
Ebola Emergency Response.6.  
Whilst the Security Council even discussing a health issue was unusual 
(although not unique - it has periodically discussed HIV/AIDS since 2000), the 2014-
15 Ebola outbreak was the first example of the Security Council taking on a major 
leadership role in response to a public health emergency. Certainly, however, the 
Council had a longstanding interest in West Africa. Indeed, long before the creation 
of UNMEER, the Council had a mission present in one of the most severely affected 
countries - UNMIL (the United Nations Mission in Liberia). At the time Ebola struck, 
810,/ZDVLQLWVµGUDZGRZQ¶SKDVHGHVLJQHGWRGHOLYHU³DVXFFHVVIXOWUDQVLWLRQRI
FRPSOHWHVHFXULW\ UHVSRQVLELOLW\´ WR WKH/LEHULDQJRYHUQPHQW LQ7. UNMIL was 
not a mission designed to deal with a major public health emergency and it was only 
present in one of the three most affected countries.  However, the drawdown 
continued through the crucial early months of the outbreak (and in August the 
Secretary-General recommended that it continue as planned8GHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDW³WKH
mission in Liberia sent increasingly dire cables [to WHO] about the virus, calling for 
help from [WHO Executive-'LUHFWRU@'U&KDQDQGRWKHUVDERXWZKDWWRGR´9 
Given the widespread criticism over the tardiness of the international response 
(a PHEIC was not declared until 8 August and UNMEER was only established in 
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September - almost six months after the first cases were detected, by which time there 
had been over 5,000 confirmed, probable or suspected cases and 2622 deaths10), there 
is a case to be made that the UN, and particularly the Security Council, failed to make 
best use of the potential resource it had in UNMIL during the early stage of the 
RXWEUHDN0LFKDHO56Q\GHUIRUH[DPSOHZURWHSULRUWRWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶VILUVW
Ebola meeting) that  
 
>810,/¶V@ PDQGDWH LQFOXGHV WKH SURYLVLRQ RI KXPDQitarian assistance and, 
crucially, the protection of civilians. In the past, this mostly meant protection 
against armed groups; however, UNMIL now needs to interpret this language 
to mean supporting the government in its effort to protect the population 
against a deadly pathogen.11 
 
The delay in mounting a coordinated response on the part of the UN, particularly 
between the WHO and Department of Peacekeeping Operations, could be seen as all 
the more puzzling given there appeared to be a precedent 0218& WKH 81¶V
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) had played a role in providing 
logistical support and communications capabilities during an EVD outbreak in 
Democratic Republic of Congo seven years earlier. 12  
In this article, we examine the question of whether UNMIL could and should 
have done more with the forces it already had deployed in Liberia to contribute to the 
emergency response. In particular, given the concerns that the UN mission had about 
the capacity of the Liberian government to respond to the crisis, we consider the 
effect of the mission drawdown as security and health personnel crises unfolded 
around the country at the height of the outbreak. The broader question underlying the 
analysis of this case is whether, given the recent emphasis on civilian protection in 
SHDFHNHHSLQJPDQGDWHVDQGWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶VDSSDUHQWH[SDQGLQJUROHLQJOREDO
GLVHDVH UHVSRQVH SXEOLF KHDOWK HPHUJHQFLHV FRXOG DQG VKRXOG EHFRPH D µQHZ
SHDFHNHHSLQJPLVVLRQ¶ 
We begin by briefly outlining the context of the outbreak in Liberia before 
looking at whether UNMIL had the necessary authorization and capacity to play a 
greater role than it did. In the final section of the paper we shift the focus to look at 
issues of appropriateness, drawing out some lessons from the Liberian Ebola case to 
shed light on the issue of whether or not peacekeepers should be used to address 
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future public health emergencies in the developing countries in which they are often 
deployed.   
We find that UNMIL could have done more than it did within the terms of its 
mandate, although even if it had chosen to do so it may well have been hampered by a 
number of factors including its own capacities, the view of the Troop Contributing 
Countries (TCCs) involved, and the approach taken by the Liberian government. 
Despite these limitations, continuing the drawdown process and largely confining 
UNMIL troops to their barracks through the first months of the outbreak reduced the 
overall response capacity available in Liberia ± and included the effective withdrawal 
of vital health services that the mission had previously provided. More generally, we 
suggest that this case can inform broader discussions over the provision of medical 
and other forms of humanitarian assistance by peacekeeping missions, including those 
around the dangers of politicizing humanitarian aid and of peacekeepers doing more 
harm than good.13 Overall, we argue that peacekeeping missions may have a minor 
supporting role to play, but they are not a reliable mechanism for responding to public 
health emergencies. It is important that the lessons learned from Liberia¶V (9'
outbreak so not lead them to be seen in those terms, even if the Security Council 
continues to carve out a role for itself DV D OHDGHU LQ WKH ILHOG RI µJOREDO KHDOWh 
security¶. 
)LQDOO\ ZH VXJJHVW WKDW 810,/¶V SUH-Ebola practices may contain some 
valuable lessons about the desirability of peacekeeping missions providing medical 
services to civilian populations even outside of public health emergencies. Whilst 
such activities can be understood in both humanitarian and strategic terms (as a 
response to manifest need; and as a way of building positive relations with host 
communities), there is a danger of fostering dependence, unwittingly undermining the 
development of the sustainable domestic health systems that will be crucial to the 
response to any future public health crisis. 
 
UNMIL and the Ebola outbreak in Liberia 
The first EVD cases in Liberia were confirmed in Lofa county on 30 March 2014. On 
2 April, an infected individual from Lofa travelled to the capital Monrovia, 
unknowingly bringing the disease to a major urban centre.14 From that point onwards 
infections increased exponentially. When the WHO declared Ebola a PHEIC on 
August 8th, there had been 294 deaths in the country as a result of the disease.15 By the 
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time the Security Council met on 18 September this had increased to 1,459. Liberia 
was officially declared Ebola-free on 9 May 2015, by which stage the death toll stood 
at 4,716.16 A small number of further cases were diagnosed in June and July, before 
the country was once again declared officially Ebola Free on 3 September 2015.17 
 Originally created as a multidimensional peacekeeping operation to monitor 
the August 2003 ceasefire agreement that brought an end tR/LEHULD¶VFLYLOZDUDWWKH
time the Ebola outbreak began UNMIL was in the second phase of its drawdown 
plan.18 From a peak of 15,520 troops in 2006, by June 2014 DQGWKHVWDUWRI/LEHULD¶V
EVD outbreak, the number had been reduced to just over 4,500.19  The potential 
impact of Ebola on these mission personnel quickly attracted attention, especially 
from TCCs. Several expressed concern for the safety of their personnel, and the 
Philippines announced on 23 August that it was withdrawing its 115 troops from the 
mission - despite assurances from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that the threat 
posed to them was limited: 
 
All United Nations personnel in Liberia have been educated about the 
appropriate preventive measures that would minimize the risk of contracting 
Ebola, which is not airborne and requires direct contact with the bodily fluids 
of a symptomatic infected person or the deceased. I am therefore confident 
that United Nations personnel may continue their important work in Liberia.20 
 
Nevertheless, the emergence of Ebola in areas where UNMIL units were stationed led 
WR WKH PLVVLRQ¶V JHQHUDO DGYLFH WR LWV XQLWV WR FORVH 810,/ IDFLOLWLHV IURP SXEOLF
access.21 All personnel were restricted to essential movement only, and an isolation 
centre was created to screen personnel for possible infection. 22  Despite these 
measures, the mission did suffer from infections. The first death of an UNMIL staff 
member from EVD came on 25 September; the second on 13 October.  
At the end of August, the Secretary General reversed his recommendation 
IURPWZRZHHNVHDUOLHUDQGUHFRPPHQGHGDUROORYHURI810,/¶VPDQGDWHIRUWKUHH
PRQWKV ³WR PRQLWRU WKH KXPDQ ULJKWV VLWXDWLRQ DQG EHWWHU IDFLOLWDWH KXPDQLWDULDQ
assistance during the crisis by helping maintain the necessary security conditionV´23 
In a series of meetings in September 2014, the Security Council discussed the 
situation in Liberia, focusing largely on the efforts of the DPKO to keep UNMIL 
peacekeepers safe from the outbreak ± although Karin Landgren, Head of UNMIL, 
also briefed the Council on the situation in Liberia more generally and reported that 
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810,/³KDGWXUQHGLWV IXOOIRFXVRQ(ERODVLQFHODWH-XO\DQGZDVZRUNLQJLQIRXU
areas:  security and rule of law, logistics, communications and outreach and 
coordination at the centraO DQG FRXQWU\ OHYHO´ (YHQ RQFH WKH\ JRW XQGHUZD\ 
however, WKHVH W\SHVRI DFWLYLW\ZHUH LQ WKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIFDVHV µVXSSRUWLYH¶DQG
indirect: donating vehicles for use against Ebola, providing medical training to local 
health workers, and providing public communication on Ebola prevention via UNMIL 
radio and community outreach.24 The Mission did not play an active role in treating 
Ebola patients (other than its own personnel) and (despite its security provision role) 
explicitly distanced itself from invoOYHPHQW LQ WKH /LEHULDQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V disease-
containment-related security operations such as the isolation of the West Point district 
of Monrovia, which led to violent clashes between the public and the Liberian 
security forces.25   
These decisions to play only a supporting role were in many ways 
understandable, not least due to the need to keep concerned TCCs in the mission and a 
desire to avoid associating the mission with the (inappropriate in the view of many) 
militarised response of the Liberian government.26 Nevertheless, these decisions had 
considerable impact given WKH PLVVLRQ¶V SUHYLRXV SUDFWLFH LQ GHOLYHULQJ ERWK KHDOWK
and security services, which we discuss in the following section. Effectively returning 
mission personnel to their barracks once EVD emerged did not, therefore, represent 
merely a failure to step up and provide direct assistance, but in fact led to the effective 
withdrawal of assistance (both security and medical) that had previously been 
provided. 27  This was despite the fact that the weaknesses of the Liberian health 
system were well-known (one of the reasons UNMIL was so active in its medical 
outreach activities), and that LQWKHPLVVLRQ¶VSURJUHVVUHSRUWH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQV
about the political and security practices of the Liberian government. The relationship 
between these weaknesses and the Ebola response was not examined in depth in the 
August report. 28   Indeed it was not until the Security Council session in early 
September that the head of UNMIL, Karin Landgren, openly doubted the 
HIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKH/LEHULDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVH29  
 These choices may be interpreted ± and indeed were by some - as a missed 
opportunity to make a fuller contribution in the crucial early months of the outbreak. 
But they also raise some more general questions about the role of peacekeeping 
missions in public health emergencies. The idea that UNMIL could and should have 
done more rests on a series of underlying assumptions: that peacekeeping missions (in 
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particular in this case UNMIL) are authorised to play a greater role; that they are 
capable of doing so safely and effectively; and that they are an appropriate 
mechanism for carrying out such tasks. In the following sections of this paper we 
discuss the issues of authorization and capacity, before turning to a discussion of the 
appropriateness of peacekeeping forces as a mechanism for addressing public health 
emergencies in the developing countries in which they are most-often deployed. 
 
Authorization 
The first assumption that we examine is that UNMIL was authorized to play a more 
active role in responding to Ebola than it did. This is not uncontroversial ± and such a 
role could entail various things, from providing security to allow humanitarian aid 
agencies to work to more direct forms of medical assistance such as treatment by 
810,/¶VPHGLFDOVWDII 
The mandate is always the starting point for examining issues of peacekeeping 
authorization, with the mandate for each mission being specified in the relevant 
resolution(s) of the UN Security Council. The original UNMIL mandate, as set out by 
the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in Resolution 1509 
(2003) outlined a 19-point mandate, the most important clauses of which charged 
UNMIL with the tasks of observing and monitoring the ceasefire; assisting with the 
development and operation of cantonment sites; developing and implementing a 
DDRR action plan; and providing security services at key institutions.30  
Resolution 2116 (2013), the authorizing resolution in force at the beginning of 
WKH (EROD RXWEUHDN UHDIILUPHG WKDW ³810,/¶V SULPDU\ WDVNV DUH WR FRQWLQXH WR
support the Government in order to solidify peace and stability in Liberia and to 
SURWHFWFLYLOLDQV´31 Civilian protection was thus a part of the mandate, although this 
did not include an explicit requirement to deliver medical aid or other forms of 
KXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFH,QGHHGWKHPDQGDWHZDVFOHDUWKDW810,/¶VPLVVLRQZDVWR
play a facilitating rather than a direct humanitarian assistance role: 
 
(k) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping 
to establish the necessary security conditions. 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, in September 2014, the Security Council 
pDVVHG 5HVROXWLRQ  ZKLFK H[SUHVVHG ³JUDYH FRQFHUQ DERXW WKH H[WHQW RI WKH
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RXWEUHDNRIWKH(ERODYLUXV´DQGH[WHQGHG810,/¶VPDQGDWHWR'HFHPEHULQ
the process deferring the planned drawdown). In that Resolution the Council noted 
that it was  
 
Expressing deep appreciation for and commending the continued contribution 
and commitment of United Nations personnel, especially the troop- and police 
contributing countries of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to 
assist in consolidating peace and stability in Liberia, and the efforts of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General32 
 
That was followed on 15 December 2014 by Resolution 2190 (2014) which repeated 
WKH VHQWLPHQWV RI WKH 6HSWHPEHU UHVROXWLRQ DQG XSGDWHG 810,/¶V PDQGDWH 7KH
humanitarian assistance mandate given to the mission remained very similar to that of 
2003: 
 
(b)(i) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including in 
collaboration with the Government of Liberia, and those supporting it, and by 
helping to establish the necessary security conditions.33 
 
What can be said, therefore, is that, notwithstanding the overall civilian protection 
PDQGDWHWKHUHLVQRWKLQJLQ810,/¶VPDQGDWH± even as renewed during the Ebola 
outbreak ± that tasked it with directly providing humanitarian assistance, although it 
was given a role in facilitating the provision of such assistance by other parties 
through helping to establish the necessary security conditions. 
,QDGGLWLRQWRHDFKPLVVLRQ¶VPDQGDWHWKH'3.2KDVDOVRSURGXFHG a range of 
other guidance and information relevant to peacekeeper provision of humanitarian 
(including medical) assistance, perhaps the most notable of which is the 2008 
Principles and Guidelines to Peacekeeping Operations (commonly known as the 
µ&DSVWRQH 'RFWULQH¶WKDWSURYLGHVJHQHULFJXLGDQFHRQWKHUROHVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV
of peacekeepers serving in UN missions. 34  Principles and Guidelines includes 
material concerning the organization, management and support to missions and states 
FOHDUO\ WKDW WKH ³FRUH EXVLQHVV´ RI SHDFHNHHSHUV LV WR VWDELOL]H WKH VLWXDWLRQ DQG
provide a secure environment for civilians and humanitarian actors.35 When it comes 
to playing a more direct role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, meanwhile, 
the document notes that responsibility: 
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rests primarily with the relevant civilian United Nations specialized agencies, 
funds and programmes, as well as the range of independent, international and 
local NGOs which are usually active alongside a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation. The primary role of United Nations peacekeeping operations with 
regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance is to provide a secure and 
stable environment within which humanitarian actors may carry out their 
activities.36 
 
 Could it nevertheless have been argued that UNMIL was authorised to play a 
more direct role in delivering medical aid during the EVD outbreak even without a 
specific request from the Security Council? In our view it possibly could. There are 
two particular areas where we find official endorsement of a role for peacekeepers in 
the direct delivery of humanitarian medical aid (rather than solely as facilitators of 
humanitarian access): Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), which includes health care 
delivery and services (sometimes UHIHUUHGWRDV4XLFN,PSDFW3URMHFWV¶>4,3V@37 and 
cases of extreme emergency. 
First, the DPKO does recommend that in some circumstances missions should 
engage in QIPs, designed to benefit the population through small-scale infrastructure 
and/or public communication projects, which may include a health/medical 
component - DOWKRXJK LW VWUHVVHV WKDW WKHVH DUH ³QRW D VXEVWLWXWH IRU KXPDQLWDULDQ
DQGRU GHYHORSPHQW DVVLVWDQFH´ 38 As we discuss below, UNMIL has a long track-
record of engaging in such projects in the health field, with medical outreach and 
related activities being undertaken by a number of different national contingents over 
the history of the mission. The impetus for such activities frequently comes from the 
FRQWLQJHQWV RQ WKH JURXQG UDWKHU WKDQ 1HZ <RUN 7KH 81¶V 'HSDUWPHQW RI )LHOG
Support (DFS), responsible for the day-to-day management of peacekeeping 
operations, states that all civil assistance, including health care delivery, should be 
coordinated with other humanitarian entities and subject to review by the UN-CIMIC 
DQGWKHPLVVLRQDSSURYDOSURFHVV¶ 39   
The other set of circumstances in which peacekeepers are authorized to play 
an explicit humanitarian role is in cases of extreme emergency. OCHA provides 
guidance on the relationship between civilian and military actors during complex 
emergencies40 as well as mission specific guidance; the priority in both cases being to 
ensure that conflict is avoided between military and humanitarian actors and that the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid provision are respected 
(and are seen to be respected). In terms of coordination, these guidelines seek to 
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forward the broader UN integration policy WR ³'HOLYHU DV 2QH´ ZKLOVW DW WKH VDPH
WLPH HQVXULQJ WKDW SHDFHNHHSHUV PDLQWDLQ SULPDU\ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU D PLVVLRQ¶V
political and security objectives, whilst humanitarian agencies lead the response in 
that sector. The intention is to see these roles blend only in situations where an 
HPHUJHQF\ LV VR JUHDW DV WR UHTXLUH LW IRU H[DPSOH ZKHUH ³RQO\ WKH XVH RI PLOLWDU\
DVVHWVFDQPHHWDFULWLFDOKXPDQLWDULDQQHHG´DQGHYHQWKHQRQO\DVD³ODVWUHVRUW´41 
7KH'3.2KDVVLPLODUO\PDGHUHIHUHQFH WR³HPHUJHQF\UHVSRQVHSHULRGV´ LQZKLFK
there is a potential need for humanitarian assistance to be provided directly by a 
peacekeeping mission rather than by specialised humanitarian agencies. In such cases 
the only objective is to save lives, ensure protection, and meet basic, urgent needs. 
7KH'3.2JRHVRQ WRQRWH WKDW LQ WKHVH VLWXDWLRQV ³LW LV LPSRUWDQW WRNHHS ORQJHU-
term objectives in mind and begin planning for the more comprehensive humanitarian 
SURJUDPPHVWKDWZLOOEHSRVVLEOHLQDPRUHVWDEOHHQYLURQPHQW´42   
It would surely be the case that the Ebola outbreak in Liberia as it developed 
WKURXJK  ZRXOG TXDOLI\ DV VXFK DQ µHPHUJHQF\¶ MXVWLI\LQJ 810,/ SOD\LQJ D
greater role without compromising the terms of its mandate, and without the mission 
contravening more general UN guidelines and principles. Particularly in the early 
stages of the outbreak, the acute shortage of trained medical personnel reduced any 
danger of problematic overlap with the activities of humanitarian aid agencies. That 
UNMIL did not use the developing emergency as a basis to justify doing more 
suggests that issues of capacity and competence were the primary limitation. Certainly 
that is the implication to be derived from the comments of Under-Secretary-General 
for UN Peacekeeping OperationV+HUYp/DGVRXVZKHQKHVWDWHGWKDWµDSHDFHNHHSLQJ
PLVVLRQLVQRWDSXEOLFKHDOWKRSHUDWLRQ>DV@³WKLVLVQRWZKDWZHDUHWUDLQHGIRU´¶43   
 
Capacity and competence 
As is the case with all peacekeeping operations, UNMIL was deployed with its own 
medical services whose primary role was (and is) to provide healthcare services to 
mission staff (both military and civilian) during their deployment.44 Yet it is clear 
IURP 810,/¶V SXEOLF FRPPXQLFDWLRQV WKDW SULRU WR (EROD assisting with logistics 
and even in the direct delivery of medical services to local populations in the mission 
area, and not just to mission personnel, was a significant part of their daily work ± and 
DOVRDQLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRIWKHµSXEOLFIDFH¶RIWKHPLVVLRQ  
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Indeed, the extent to which the outer provinces of Liberia in particular were 
dependent upon the presence and assistance of UNMIL is striking.  UNMIL has 
provided the only supply chain for moving essential logistical equipment, as well as 
personnel from the Liberian National Police force and medical staff to the outer 
provinces.  In the (six-month) rainy season µroads become impassable and cannot 
sustain major logistics movements...There are no in-country commercial alternatives 
to the UNMIL military engineering units that keep critical supply lines open; there are 
also serious shortfalls in the national medical system¶ UNMIL ± despite the 
drawdown ± ZDVVWLOOUHTXLUHGWRµVXSSRUWFLYLOLDQSHUVRQQHOLQFOXGLQJSROLFH>DQG
presumably medical staff], deployed throughout the country¶45  This situation has 
resulted in two dependencies ± a reliance on UNMIL to facilitate access to Liberian 
medical staff in the outer provinces, or failing that, on UNMIL itself to provide 
medical assistance to Liberian citizens. 
7KH PLVVLRQ¶V SXEOLFDWLRQ UNMIL Today frequently included reports of 
WURRSV¶ involvement in providing medical services to civilian populations ± in 
particular (but not only) women and children. Examples include reports of medical 
outreach initiatives in Bensonville, near Monrovia, where more that 300 patients were 
treated by Nigerian UNMIL medical personnel (reported June 2009);46 a paediatric 
de-worming programme along the Zorzor ± Voinjama road (carried out by 
Bangladeshi troops and reported November 2009) 47  D ZHHNO\ µPHHW WKH GRFWRU¶
organised by the Bangladeshi battalion at Camp Charlie in Ganta which, at the time of 
the report in July 2010, was claimed to have treated over 1350 patients48; a Pakistani 
Battalion-run clinic providing medical assistance to the blind and visually impaired in 
Tubmanburg, Bomi County (reported July 2010)49; and an outreach programme, again 
run by troops from Pakistan, in Careysburg, Montserrado County, where over 500 
received treatment (reported August 2010).50 The UNMIL Facebook page ± which 
began in 2011 ± has similarly featured regular reports of medical outreach activities. 
These have included treating 900 residents of Plumkor Community in Brewerville, 
Montserrado County51; offering training to medical staff in a Liberian hospital52; a 
Christmas±time medical outreach day at Virginia Christian Academy near River 
View, Monrovia53; and countless other examples of outreach days in communities 
including students at the Darussalam International Islamic Mission, 54  inmates at 
Monrovia Central Prison,55 and the Hotel Africa community56.  
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 Of course, QHLWKHU810,/¶VLPSRUWDQWUROHLQSURYLGLQJORJLVWLFDOFDSDELOLWLHV
to the Liberian health sector nor the medical outreach initiatives (most of which were 
for limited periods of time and involved relatively small numbers of UNMIL 
personnel) meant that the mission was in a position (either in terms of manpower or 
equipment) to play a major part in responding to a public health emergency on the 
scale of Ebola. But they do indicate that it may have been able to play a greater part 
than it did, and it remains striking that the first reaction was for battalions to return to 
barracks ± and also, as we noted above, that the vast majority of existing medical 
outreach activities ceased once the Ebola outbreak began. 
 One obvious lesson here is that the views and demands of TCCs were a key 
capacity constraint on the mission. The withdrawal of the Philippines contingent and 
WKH UHOXFWDQFH RI RWKHU 7&&V WR VHH WKHLU WURRSV SXW µLQ KDUP¶V ZD\¶ LQ D UDSLGO\
developing health crisis certainly limited the extent to which peacekeepers could play 
a more active role. But even without those constraints, there were good reasons to 
question whether the UNMIL medical services could have effectively (and safely) 
made a significant contribution to controlling Ebola in public health terms (as 
opposed to the mission making a greater potential logistical and security contribution 
if it had not continued drawdown ± a point to which we return below). 
 For one, there had over a number of years been serious criticisms of the 
TXDOLW\DQGVDIHW\RI810,/¶VPHGLFDOVHUYLFHV,QWKH81¶V2IILFHRI,QWHUQDO
2YHUVLJKW 6HUYLFHV¶ 2,26 DXGLW RI 810,/ LGHQWLILHG IDLOXUHV LQ WKH TXDOLW\ RI
medical care being provided in this mission to both troops and civilian populations.57 
Amongst other things, it found a lack of standard operating procedures to guide 
7&&¶V SURYLVLRQ RI PHGLFDO FDUH QR SURIHVVLRQDO VXSSRUW DQG WUDLQLQJ DYDLODEOH WR
upgrade medical personnel skills; inadequate hygiene in TCC clinics; and failures to 
comply with WHO guidelines on the disposal of medical waste. During the audit, the 
OIOS also found that peacekeepers were providing medical treatment to local 
populations despite their clinics not meeting basic medical standards for hygiene and 
waste management. All of this means that there must be caution in the presumption 
WKDW810,/¶VPHGLFDOVHUYLFHVZHUHZHOO-placed to assist with an infectious disease 
outbreak as deadly and virulent as EVD. Indeed, as noted by the OIOS audit, one of 
the major health concerns surrounding UN peacekeeping is the potential for 
SHDFHNHHSHUV WR EH ³YHFWRUV´ RI GLVHDVH ± to spread infection through the local 
community.58 As well as the obvious negative health impact on affected civilians, 
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such events can have other damaging effects, including straining relations between a 
mission and the host community.  
 Where UNMIL may have been better-placed to play a more active role earlier 
than it did is in relation to logistical support (continuing or augmenting its previous 
role), and in assisting the Liberian government with spread of information about the 
virus throughout the provinces. However, the drawdown had a significant detrimental 
effect RQ810,/¶VSURYLQFLDOSUHVHQFHAs we noted above, UNMIL was one of few 
international actors that had a strong logistical capability in the provinces prior to the 
outbreak, and it was noted during the Ebola crisis that the peacekeeping mission in 
Liberia had the comparative advantage to other UN agencies in terms of its 
geographic reach and political leverage.59 But by the time of the Security Council 
session on 9 September 2014 it was reported that UNMIL had completed drawdown 
from four provinces and was now only present in only seven of 15. Improving the 
limited capacity to provide rapid response in the outer provinces was later noted by 
WHO as vital to containing the outbreak.60   
The lack of international coordination in responding to the Ebola outbreak also 
hampered 810,/¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHHPHUJHQF\LQ/Lberia. For example, in late July 
the UN had asked US CDC not publicly release projected end-of-year Ebola cases, in 
part because UNMIL had reported that the situation was tense on the ground. This 
advice was not followed and UNMIL ± still in drawdown mode at the time ± had to 
quickly prepare for a security response to riots and shootings in Monrovia.61  The 
delay in WHO Headquarters convening an emergency committee to declare Ebola a 
PHEIC also impaired the ability of UNMIL to raise the alarm. Technically UNMIL 
could not request support to mount an emergency response action to the outbreak 
without prio action from WHO, the body authorised to declare a health emergency. If 
WHO Headquarters had acted sooner, there is the possibility that UNMIL Head of 
Mission may have had a greater opportunity to do more earlier.. 
In relation to assisting with security (a task which would on the fact of it seem 
WR H[SOLFLWO\ ILW ZLWKLQ WKH µIDFLOLWDWLQJ KXPDQLWDULDQ DFFHVV¶ SURYLVLRQV RI WKH
PLVVLRQ¶VPDQGDWHRQHRIWKHGLIILFulties faced by the mission was the controversial 
QDWXUHRIVRPHRIWKH/LEHULDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VRZQUHVSRQVHV7KRVHUHVSRQVHVEHFDPH
increasingly militarized over time ± with one of the most high-profile incidents being 
the attempt to forcibly quarantine the West Point district of Monrovia, an attempt that 
culminated in clashes between the public and the security services.62 Not only was 
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UNMIL not involved in such operations, it was at pains to distance itself from them.63 
This dimension of the Ebola response points to the difficult choices that peacekeeping 
missions such as UNMIL face when dealing with complex emergencies within their 
mission areas. In the next part of this paper we go on to unpack some of these issues, 
considering the question of whether or not, where present on the ground, 
peacekeeping missions are appropriate bodies for responding to rapidly-developing 
public health emergencies. 
 
Peacekeepers: A role in responding to health emergencies? 
In the previous section we argued that UNMIL could have done more within the terms 
of its mandate, although the types of contribution it was in a position to make were 
limited by a range of factors including the views of the TCCs involved, the resources 
and competencies of the mission, problems of inter-agency coordination, and the 
actions of the host government. But aside from these issues, what can we say about 
the appropriate role of peacekeepers in responding to the Ebola outbreak and to future 
public health emergencies? 
It is clearly not the case ± and nobody would try to argue ± that peacekeepers 
are ideally suited to responding to major disease outbreaks. The question, rather, is 
whether, in the absence of other agencies better-placed to take on the burden of the 
task, it is appropriate for peacekeepers who are already on the ground to play a role as 
HPHUJHQF\µILUVWUHVSRQGHUV¶ 
It was noted in the Introduction to a recent special issue of Third World 
Quarterly RQ WKH µORFDO WXUQ¶ LQ SHDFHEXLOGLQJ WKDW FULWLFV RIWHQ point to the 
µVKDOORZQHVV RI LQWHUYHQWLRQV WKDW VHUYH WKH LQWHUYHQHU EHWWHU WKDQ WKH WDUJHWV RI
intervention. Overall, however, practices remain as they were, and peacebuilding in 
post-FRQIOLFW FRQWH[WV UHPDLQV YRODWLOH¶64 Liberia, even before the Ebola outbreak, 
was a country struggling to live up to the liberal peace ideal. The dependence we 
described above on external agencies, including UNMIL, for local healthcare service 
delivery ± a problem identified nted long before EVD - points to a collective failure 
by the national government and international donors to build domestic health system 
capacities. 65  As was widely noted, the Ebola outbreak graphically illustrated the 
weaknesses of the health infrastructure in Liberia (as well as the other two most-
affected countries). Liberia had resided near the bottom of all of the league tables for 
health indicators and health system development for many years before the outbreak. 
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In terms of life expectancy it ranked 166th in the world.66 On the league table of 
physicians per 1,000 people it did even worse, being ranked 194th in the world 
(jointly with Sierra Leone, at 0.03 physicians per 1,000 people).67 The Ebola outbreak 
(and certainly its scale) was to a great extent the product of a decade and more of 
failure to transition Liberia to an effective state. 
Yet, taking the Liberian health system as it was in 2014, what can the UNMIL 
experience reveal about the suitability of peacekeeping missions as first responders to 
major public health crises? If the Security Council continues to play a leading role 
in international responses to such events, it may be tempted to view the peacekeeping 
forces which it has stationed around the world as a potential tool ± as might the 
Secretary-General, given his recommendation of extending the UNMIL mandate to 
enable it to assist in the response. In this section we raise two doubts about the 
appropriateness of peacekeeping forces playing a significant role in responding 
(especially in a medical capacity) to health emergencies. Whilst, as we have discussed 
above, there were opportunities for UNMIL to have done more, there are dangers (and 
the potential for dangerous precedents) that must be acknowledged before advocating 
that peacekeepers should be in the front line of responding to health emergencies. In 
this section we discuss: first, the danger of humanitarian aid becoming politicised and 
second, the potential that even well-intentioned actions could do more harm than 
good. 
 
Politicization 
One of the potential downsides of the engagement of military forces (even those 
serving in blue helmets) in delivering aid is that it can undermine the perceived 
neutrality of humanitarian assistance. This fact is well-recognised by the UN itself. In 
discussing QIPs, Principles and Guidelines recommends that missions should consult 
with humanitarian actors and: 
 
be aware that humanitarian actors may have concerns about the 
characterization of QIPs, or Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) projects, 
³KHDUWVDQGPLQGV´DFWLYLWLHVRURWKHUVHFXULW\RUUHFRYHU\SURMHFWVDVEHLQJRI
a humanitarian nature, when they see these as primarily serving political, 
security or reconstruction priorities.68 
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$FOHDUH[SUHVVLRQRIWKLVIHDUIURPWKHKXPDQLWDULDQDLGFRPPXQLW\¶s side was seen 
in 1997 when Cornelio Sommaruga, then President of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), argued that the separation of peacekeeping duties from the 
provision of humanitarian assistance was essential: 
 
UN military missions are an essential component of successful conflict 
management; in certain anarchic situations they may prove indispensable in 
securing respect for international humanitarian law and thus restoring the 
necessary security environment for the conduct of humanitarian activities. 
That being said, peacekeeping, and especially peace-enforcement operations, 
should be clearly distinct in character from humanitarian activities. Military 
forces should not be directly involved in humanitarian action, as this would 
associate humanitarian organizations, in the minds of the authorities and the 
population, with political or military objectives which go beyond humanitarian 
concerns.69 
 
6LPLODU FRQFHUQVZHUH DSSDUHQW LQ WKH:+2*OREDO +HDOWK&OXVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQ
paper on civil-military roles and responsibilities. That report noted that neither the 
IASC nor the Security Council has adequately addressed the division of 
responsibilities that reflect the multidisciplinary UN mission environment. The 
concern, as voiced by the WHO was that: 
 
[T]his blending of strategies and tactics serves to undermine the international 
KXPDQLWDULDQ FRPPXQLW\¶V FRUH KXPDQLWDULDQ SULQFLSOHV  7KH LQWHJUDWHG
mission concept developed by the UN follows a similar trend. Although there 
are significant attempts to protect the humanitarian space within integrated 
missions, the concept foresees the integration of different agencies and 
components into an overall political/strategic crisis management framework. 
7KLVFDQEOXUWKHOLQHVEHWZHHQWKH81¶VGLIIHUHQWpolitical and humanitarian 
branches, with predictably negative results.70   
 
Whilst protection of humanitarian space was not a major problem in the case of 
/LEHULDDOWKRXJKWKHPLVVLRQZDVUHOXFWDQWWRDVVRFLDWHLWVHOIZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
controversial security operations for fear of politicization), the transfer of 
responsibility was proving a problem, particularly to local government structures 
outside of Monrovia.71   In this respect, of course, Liberia was not typical of all 
peacekeeping missions: this was a relatively stable country in the midst of a 
drawdown of the UN presence, without the kinds of antagonism that other 
peacekeeping missions can face. In the Liberia case, indeed, the widespread 
DFFHSWDQFHRI810,/¶VSUHVHQFHZDVLWVHOISDUWRIWKHSURElem, creating a worrying 
 17 
dependence on the mission for access outside of Monrovia at a time when it was 
continuing with drawdown despite the developing humanitarian emergency. Yet in 
other cases peacekeeping missions are more controversial, and their engagement in 
delivering humanitarian assistance could pose risks to perceptions of aid neutrality. 
 
Doing more harm than good 
$VHFRQGGDQJHU UHODWHV WR /DVGRXV¶ FRPPHQW WKDW ³WKLV LV QRWZKDWZHDUH WUDLQHG
IRU´ DQG UHODWHV WR WKHSRVVLELOLW\ WKDWSHDFHNHHSLng missions attempting to provide 
assistance in cases of a major public health emergency could unwittingly end up 
doing more harm than good. We have already mentioned the findings of the OIOS 
DXGLWRI810,/¶VPHGLFDOVHUYLFHV WKDW WKHUHZHUHZRUU\LQJ IDLOXres ± including in 
hygiene standards in facilities used to provide treatment to the civilian population. 
Whilst steps had been taken to address these issues in the intervening years, the high 
standards of infection control required in the treatment of infectious diseases such as 
Ebola point to the potential dangers of under-equipped and ill-prepared interventions 
± however well-intentioned. The experience of the UNMIH mission in Haiti, which 
was accused of having been responsible for a serious cholera outbreak following the 
2010 earthquake,72 serves as a warning about the importance of infection control, and 
the possible implications of peacekeeping missions failing to maintain strict standards 
in this respect.  
 In terms of the potential for logistical and security assistance to do more harm 
than good the risks are perhaps more limited ± but are not entirely absent. Even if 
there is a mandate provision to respond to a health emergency, the Security Council 
remains dependent on TCCs to provide it with the personnel and other resources that 
it needs. This posed a problem in the Ebola outbreak, with TCCs being extremely 
wary of exposing their troops to risk of infection and would likely similarly arise in 
future situations. Difficult relationships and policy disagreements with host 
governments can also pose problems - FOHDUO\ D IDFWRU LQ 810,/¶V GHVLUH WR
disassociate itself from some of the security operations of the Liberian government. 
Even though (indeed precisely because) they are humanitarian emergencies, major 
outbreak events can be deeply politicized, with governments often opting to take 
unpopular and authoritarian actions in the name of disease control. There are clearly 
risks in the UN becoming associated with such actions, not least given the 
Organi]DWLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQRIVXSSRUWIRUKXPDQULJKWVDURXQGWKHZRUOG(QJDJHPHQWLQ
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such controversial activities could create new complications both for the mission itself 
and for the UN family as a whole. 
 
Conclusions 
This discussion leads us to two final observations on the role of UNMIL in the 
Liberian Ebola outbreak, and more generally on the potential role of peacekeeping 
missions in responding to public health emergencies in the developing world. 
First, there may have been opportunities for UNMIL to play a greater role than 
it did ± especially early in the outbreak ± but it could never have been an optimal 
response mechanism for a number of reasons. Whilst the mission probably did have 
scope under its mandate to justify a bigger role (especially, for example, in logistics 
and support in the provinces), it suffered a number of limitations including the 
willingness of TCCs to allow their personnel to play this role and the effects that 
drawdown had already begun to have. The actions of the Liberian government also 
arguably made it more politically difficult for UNMIL to play a more significant role 
in providing the security conditions under which the humanitarian response could 
operate effectively. What is more, there are important questions to be asked about the 
competence and capacity of some TCCs medical services when confronting a deadly 
infectious disease threat. At the very least, however, we would argue that the 
drawdown should have been halted at an earlier stage in the outbreak, a decision that 
may have allowed UNMIL to contribute more to the developing international effort. 
Second, there are broader questions raised by the Liberia case about the 
provision of medical assistance to civilians by peacekeeping missions. Whilst we 
would accept that there is a case for mission medics to play a role in emergency 
VLWXDWLRQVVXFKDVWKH(ERODRXWEUHDNWKHGHVLUDELOLW\RIVXFKDUROHLQµQRUPDO¶WLPHV
is more debateable. Indeed in this case the reliance on external actors, including 
810,/WRµSURSXS¶DIDLOLQJQDWLRQDOKHDOWKV\VWHPby delivering services seems to 
have been one of the underlying FDXVHV RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V IDLOXUH WR develop a 
sustainable national health system. Greater attention needs to be paid to peacekeeper 
involvement in such activities, and how transitions can be made to national 
µRZQHUVKLS¶ shifting health care delivery from blue helmets to local authorities.  
Ebola, coupled with the UNMIL drawdown, revealed the over-dependence of national 
service provision on external support ± including that provided by what was always 
designed to be a temporary peacekeeping mission. This is a moral hazard for 
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peacekeepers, and is one that all humanitarian actors feed into, but the consequences 
may not become tragically apparent until a country is thrown into the perfect storm of 
health insecurity, as happened with in Ebola outbreak.  
  
 
 
  
 20 
Notes 
                                                                    
1
 :+2³(ERODYLUXVLQ*XLQHD´ 
2
 06)³(EROD(SLGHPLF'HFODUHG´ 
3
 (QVHULN³:+2GHFODUHV(ERODHPHUJHQF\´ 
4
 UN Security Council, S/RES/ 2177, 1.  
5
 UN Security Council, S/RES/ 2177, 3. 
6
 UN General Assembly, A/RES/69/1. UNMEER was based in Ghana and initially led by Assistant 
Secretary General for Field Support Anthony Banbury. Banbury KDGDOUHDG\EHHQDSSRLQWHGµ(EROD
&ULVLVPDQDJHU¶E\WKH6*RQ6HSWHPEHUth. UN General Assembly/Security Council, A/69/389-
S/2014/679 
7
 UN Security Council, S/RES/2066. 
8
 UN Secretary General, S/2014.598 
9
 6HQJXSWD³(IIRUWRQ(EROD´&KDQ¶VRIILFHDFFRUGLQJWR6HQJXSWDFODLPHGWKDWLWKDGQRUHFRUGRI
receiving the cables.  
10
 :+2³6LWXDWLRQ5HSRUW6HSWHPEHU´ 
11
 6Q\GHU³:KDWUROH IRUSHDFHNHHSHUV"´ 
12
 :+2µ(ERODKDHPRUUKDJLFIHYHULQWKH'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRI&RQJR¶ 
13
 For further discussion of these issues see [anonymised] 
14
 :+2³/LEHULD³RYHUZKHOPHGZLWK(EROD´ 
15
 :+2$)52³(ERODXSGDWH$XJXVW´ 
16
 :+2³6LWXDWLRQ5HSRUW- 0D\´ 
17 ǡǲǳǤ 
18
 UN Security Council, S/RES/2066. 
19
 UN Secretary General, S/2014.598, 14.  
20
 4XRWHGLQ/\QFK³%DQ6D\V7URRSV6DIH´ 
21
 0HQNRU³(EROD)HDU&ORVHV810,/´ 
22
 6Q\GHU³:KDWUROH IRUSHDFHNHHSHUV"´ 
23
 81³&LWLQJ(EROD2XWEUHDN¶V7ROO´ 
24
 :HVHH³/LEHULD810,/81&RPPLW´ 
25
 81³&LWLQJ(EROD2XWEUHDN¶V7ROO´ 
26 &KDWKDP+RXVH³CRPEDWLQJ(ERODLQ/LEHULD´4. 
27
 $OO$IULFD³6DPXNDL2XWOLQHV(IIHFWV´ 
28
 UN Security Council, S/2014/598, 5, 11. 
29
 UN Security Council, S/PV.7260, 4. 
30
 UN Security Council, S/RES/1509. 
31
 UN Security Council, S/RES/2116. 
32
 UN Security Council, S/RES/2176. 
33
 UN Security Council, S/RES/2190. 
34
 UN DPKO, Principles and Guidelines 
35
 UN DPKO, Principles and Guidelines, Figure 2, 23-24. 
36
 UN DPKO, Principles and Guidelines, 30. 
37
 UN DPKO, ³&LYLO-PLOLWDU\FRRUGLQDWLRQ´,QGHHG4,3VZHUHUROOHGRXWWRVXSSRUWFRXQWU\KHDOWK
teams when government funds were inexplicably held up in reaching the province.  See UN Security 
Council, S/PV.7260, 5.  
38
 UN DPKO, Principles and Guidelines, 30. 
39
 UN DPKO³&LYLO-PLOLWDU\FRRUGLQDWLRQ´ 
40
 2&+$³+XPDQLWDULDQ&LYLO-0LOLWDU\&RRUGLQDWLRQ´ 
41
 2&+$³&LYLO-0LOLWDU\*XLGHOLQHV´[L 
42
 UN Peacekeeping Operations, Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping, 175. 
43
 811HZV³81ZLOOµVWD\WKHFRXUVH¶´ 
44
 UN Peacekeeping Operations, Medical Support Manual, para.1.01.  
45 UN Secretary General, S/2014.598, 6, 15. 
46
 810,/³0HGLFDO2XWUHDFKLQ*XUPRVKRU´ 
47
 810,/³%DQHQJU-'HZRUPLQJ([HUFLVH´ 
48
 UN0,/³0HHWWKH'RFWRU´ 
49
 UN 0,/³3DN(QJ-+HOSV%OLQG´ 
50
 810,/³3DN(QJU-LQ0HGLFDO2XWUHDFK´ 
51
 UNMIL, Facebook page, July 19 2012. 
 21 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
52
 UNMIL, Facebook page, July 25 2012. 
53
 UNMIL, Facebook page, December 17 2012. 
54
 UNMIL, Facebook page, June 6 2013. 
55
 UNMIL, Facebook page, October 9 2013. 
56
 UNMIL, Facebook page, December 26 2013. 
57
 812,26³$XGLWRI810,/´ 
58
 For further discussion of this issue see [anonymised] 
59
 UN Security Council S/2014/598, 10; UN Security Council, S/2014/644, 2. 
60
 :+2³/LEHULD³RYHUZKHOPHGZLWK(EROD´´ 
61
 Karin Landgren quote in ChaWKDP+RXVH³&RPEDWLQJ(ERODLQ/LEHULD´-3.  
62
 2QLVKL³&ODVKHV(UXSW´ 
63
 In a letter to the Security Council on 28 August 2014, Secretary-*HQHUDO%DQUHSRUWHGWKDW³7KRXJK
it has not, and will not, enforce the Government-imposed isolation of affected areas, UNMIL will 
continue to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to provide the 
QHFHVVDU\VHFXULW\FRQGLWLRQVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK6HFXULW\&RXQFLOUHVROXWLRQ´81
Security Council, S/2014/644, 2. 
64
 Hughes HWDO³7KHVWUXJJOHYHUVXVWKHVRQJ´ 
65
 'RZQLH³7KH5RDGWR5HFRYHU\´3HWLWDHWDO³,PSOHPHQWLQJD%DVLF3DFNDJH´ 
66
 :+2³/LIHH[SHFWDQF\E\FRXQWU\´ 
67
 1DWLRQPDVWHU³3K\VLFLDQVSHUSHRSOH´ 
68
 UN DPKO. Principles and Guidelines, 30. 
69
 6RPPDUXJD³+XPDQLWDULDQDFWLRQDQGSHDFH-keeping." 
70:+2³&LYLO-PLOLWDU\FRRUGLQDWLRQ´-12.  
71
 UN Security Council, S/2014/598, 8; see also, LeonardssRQDQG5XGG³7KHµORFDOWXUQ¶ 
72
 For a full discussion of this case see [removed for anonymity] 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
$OO$IULFD³/LEHULD6DPXNDL2XWOLQHV(IIHFWVRI(EROD- Wants Support to Lift 
7UDYHO%DQDQG6WDWHPHQWWRWKH816&E\'HIHQFH0LQLVWHU%URZQLH6DPXNDL´All 
Africa, 11 September 2014. http://allafrica.com/stories/201409111254.html   
 
Chatham House. Combating Ebola in Liberia: The Role of the International 
Community. Speaker: Karin Landgren. 10 November 2014. 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/2014111
0EbolaLiberia.pdf 
 
'RZQLH5LFKDUG7KH5RDGWR5HFRYHU\5HEXLOGLQJ/LEHULD¶V Health System. Centre 
for International Strategic Studies. August 2012. 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120822_Downie_RoadtoRecovery_web.pdf 
 
(QVHULN0DUWLQ³:+2GHclares escalating Ebola outbreak an international 
HPHUJHQF\´Nature, 8 August 2014. http://news.sciencemag.org/africa/2014/08/who-
declares-escalating-ebola-outbreak-international-emergency 
http://www.liberianobserver.com/security/ebola-fear-closes-unmil-facilities-nimba-
%E2%80%98indefinitely%E2%80%99 
 
+XJKHV&DUROLQH-RDNLPgMHQGDO,VDEHOO6FKLHUHQEHFNµ7KHVWUXJJOHYHUVXVWKH
song ± WKHORFDOWXUQLQSHDFHEXLOGLQJDQLQWURGXFWLRQ¶Third World Quarterly, 36 (5) 
2015. 
 22 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
/HRQDUGVVRQ+DQG5XGG*³7KHµORFDOWXUQ¶LQSHDFHEXLOGLQJDOLWHUDWXUHUHYLHZ
RIHIIHFWLYHDQGHPDQFLSDWRU\ORFDOSHDFHEXLOGLQJ´Third World Quarterly 36, no. 5: 
825-839. 
 
/\QFK&³%DQ6D\V817URRSVDUH6DIH1HHGHGWR4XDVK(EROD 8QUHVW´, Foreign 
Policy: The Cable, 2 September 2014. 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/09/02/ban_says_un_troops_are_safe_ne
eded_to_quash_ebola_unrest  
 
0HQNRU,)³(EROD)HDU&ORVHV810,/)DFLOLWLHV,Q1LPEDµ,QGHILQLWHO\¶´Liberian 
Observer, 16 July 2014. 
 
06)³(EROD(SLGHPLF'HFODUHGLQ*XLQHD06)/DXQFKHV(PHUJHQF\5HVSRQVH´
23 March 2014. http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/field-news/ebola-
epidemic-declared-guinea-msf-launches-emergency-response  
 
Nationmaster, ³3K\VLFLDQVSHUSHRSOH´
http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Health/Physicians/Per-1,000-people 
 
2&+$µ+XPDQLWDULDQ&LYLO-0LOLWDU\&RRUGLQDWLRQ3XEOLFDWLRQV¶
http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/publications 
 
2&+$µ&LYLO-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Humanitarian 
(PHUJHQFLHV¶*HQeva: United Nations, 2005. 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ENGLISH%20VERSION%20Guidelin
es%20for%20Complex%20Emergencies.pdf  
 
2QLVKL1RULPLWVX³&ODVKHV(UXSWDV/LEHULD6HWVDQ(EROD4XDUDQWLQH´New York 
Times, 21 August 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/world/africa/ebola-
outbreak-liberia-quarantine.html?_r=0 
 
Petit, Dörte, Egbert Sondorp, Susannah Mayhew, Maria Roura, Bayard Roberts. 
µ,PSOHPHQWLQJD%DVLF3DFNDJHRI+HDOWK6HUYLFHVLQSRVW-conflict Liberia: 
3HUFHSWLRQVRINH\VWDNHKROGHUV¶Social Science and Medicine, 78, 2013. 
 
6HQJXSWD6RPLQL³(IIRUWRQ(EROD+XUW81&KLHI´The New York Times, 6 January 
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/world/leader-of-world-health-
organization-defends-ebola-response.html?_r=0  
 
6Q\GHU05³:KDWUROHIRU81SHDFHNHHSHUVLQWDFNOLQJ(EROD"´IPI Global 
Observatory, 8 September 2014. http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/09/role-un-
peacekeepers-unmil-tackling-ebola/ 
 
6RPPDUXJD&RUQHOLRµ+XPDQLWDULDQDFWLRQDQGSHDFH-NHHSLQJRSHUDWLRQV¶
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 317 1997. 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnj7.htm 
 
 23 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
UN DPKO. Medical Support Manual for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 
2nd edn, 1999. 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D196C0B0FF3A637BC1256DD
4004983B9-dpko-medical-1999.pdf 
 
81'3.2³&LYLO-PLOLWDU\FRRUGLQDWLRQLQ81,QWHJUDWHG3HDFHNHHSLQJ0LVVLRQV´
New York: United Nations, 2010.  
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/DPKO%20UN-CIMIC%20(2010).pdf 
 
UN DPKO. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. 
New York: United Nations, 2008.  
 
UN General Assembly. A/RES/69/1, 19 September 2014. New York: United Nations. 
 
UN General Assembly/Security Council. A/69/389-S/2014/679.  ³,GHQWLFDOOHWWHUV
dated 17 September 2014 from Secretary-General addressed to the President of 
General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. New York: United 
Nations.  
 
810,/µ0HGLFDO2XWUHDFKLQ*XUPRVKRU¶UNMIL Today, 6 (1) 2009. Available at: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EE2C0DBB1ACB36EF4925761
F001AD414-Full_Report.pdf.  
 
810,/µ%DQHQJU-LQ'HZRUPLQJ([HUFLVH¶UNMIL Today 9 (6) 2009. Available 
at: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8CC159C1AD21E88949257687
00185A05-Full_Report.pdf  
 
81,0,/µ³0HHWWKH'RFWRU´¶UNMIL Today 7 (2) 2010. Available at: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A73FCCFE15906B2C4925777B
0004A60F-Full_Report.pdf.  
 
81,0,/µ3DN(QJ-+HOSVWKH%OLQG¶UNMIL Today 7 (2) 2010. Available at: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A73FCCFE15906B2C4925777B
0004A60F-Full_Report.pdf. 
 
810,/µ3DN(QJU-LQ0HGLFDO2XWUHDFK¶UNMIL Today 7 (3) 2010. Available at: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C7B9AAE1AD84B9864925779
9000CE8DA-Full_Report.pdf. 
 
UNMIL Facebook page, July 19 2012. 
 
UNMIL Facebook page, July 25 2012 
 
UNMIL Facebook page, December 17 2012 
 
UNMIL Facebook page, June 6 2013 
 
UNMIL Facebook page, October 9 2013 
 24 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
UNMIL Facebook page, December 26 2013 
 
 
811HZV³&LWLQJ(EROD2XWEUHDN¶V3URIRXQG7ROORQ/LEHULD7RS2IILFLDO7HOOV
6HFXULW\&RXQFLO3ODJXH0XVW%H6WRSSHGLQ,WV7UDFNV´6HSWHPEHU
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11553.doc.htm  
 
811HZV³(EROD81ZLOOµVWD\WKHFRXUVH¶LQ/LEHULDSHDFHNHHSLQJFKLHIVD\V´81
News Centre, 11 September 2014. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48693#.VXZSwc-qpBc 
 
812,26µ$XGLWRIWKHSURYLVLRQRIPHGLFDOVHUYLFHVLQ810,/¶$VVLJQPHQW
No.AP2008/626/08. 8 April 2009. 
http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/140720.pdf. 
 
816HFXULW\&RXQFLO6³7ZHQW\-eighth progress report of the Secretary-
*HQHUDORQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV0LVVLRQLQ/LEHULD´$XJXVW1HZ<RUN
United Nations. 
 
UN Security Council. Letter dated 28 August 2014 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2014/644. 2 September 2014. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/644 
 
816HFXULW\&RXQFLO639³th meeting of the Security Council,  9 
6HSWHPEHU´New York: United Nations, 2014. 
 
UN Security Council. S/RES/2066, 17 September 2012. New York: United Nations, 
2012. 
 
UN Security Council. S/RES/2176, 15 September 2014. New York: United Nations, 
2014. 
 
UN Security Council. S/RES/2177, 18 September 2014. New York: United Nations, 
2014. 
 
:HVHH%3³/LEHULD810,/81&RPPLWWR(EROD)LJKW´All Africa, 24 July 2014. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201407241090.html 
 
:+2³(ERODKDHPRUUKDJLFIHYHULQWKH'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRIWKH&RQJR- update 
´(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQG5HVSRQVH6HSWHPEHU
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2007_09_20/en/ 
 
:+2µ&LYLO-PLOLWDU\FRRUGLQDWLRQGXULQJKXPDQLWDULDQKHDOWKDFWLRQ¶*OREDO+HDOWK
Cluster. February 2011. 
http://www.who.int/hac/global_health_cluster/about/policy_strategy/ghc_position_pa
per_civil_military_coord_2_feb2011.pdf?ua=1 
 
 25 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
:+2µEbola transmission in Liberia over. Nation enters 90-day intensive 
surveillance period¶6HSWHPEHU
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ebola-transmission-over-
liberia/en/ 
 
:+2³(EROD5HVSRQVH5RDGPDS6LWXDWLRQ5HSRUW6HSWHPEHU´
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/133833/1/roadmapsitrep4_eng.pdf?ua=1 
 
:+2³(EROD6LWXDWLRQ5HSRUW0D\´http://apps.who.int/ebola/en/current-
situation/ebola-situation-report-6-may-2015  
 
:+2³(ERODYLUXVGLVHDVHLQ*XLQHD´0DUFK
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014_03_23_ebola/en/ 
 
:+2³/LEHULDDFRXQWU\± and its capital ± DUHRYHUZKHOPHGZLWK(ERODFDVHV´
January 2015. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/liberia/en/  
 
:+2³/LIHH[SHFWDQF\E\FRXQWU\´*OREDO+HDOWK2EVHUYDWRU\'DWD5HSRVLWRU\
2015. http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.688?lang=en 
:+2$)52³(Eola virus disease, West Africa ± XSGDWH$XJXVW´
http://www.afro.who.int/en/clusters-a-programmes/dpc/epidemic-a-pandemic-alert-
and-response/outbreak-news/4241-ebola-virus-disease-west-africa-8-august-
2014.html 
 
